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In the Supi-eme Court
of the State of Utah
RoYAL CAx.xrxG CoRPORATION a
. and CoNTINENTAL
'
corporation,
CA~l~~-\.LTY Col\IPANY, a corporation,

Plaintiffs,
No. 6383

YS.

IsnrsTRL-\.L Col\1:\IISSION OF UTAH·
and DoROTHY :NIARIE HuGHES,

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

This is an original proceeding in this court for the
purpose of reviewing the award made by the Industrial
Commission .of the State of Utah against these plaintiffs
and in favor of the defendant Dorothy Marie Hughes,
granting her compensation and ordering these plaintiffs
to pay said compensation; and the findings and conclusions of the C·ommission upon which said award is predicated, dated April 9, 1941, in the matter designated by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the Commission as Claim No. 4345. After petition for
rehearing had been filed within the time prescribed by
law by the plaintiffs herein and after the same had been
denied, plaintiffs herein, within due time, applied to
this co_urt for the issuance of writ of certiorari, which
'vas issued by this court and to which return has been
made to this court.
The case involves the question of whether or not
Dorothy Marie Hughes is entitled to the amount of compensation awarded her by the Industrial Commission.
It is the contenti~on of the plaintiffs that Dorothy Marie
Hughes is not entitled to double compensation, nor to
compensation in the amount awarded her by the ComIDlSSion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

The hearings in this matter occurred on three different dates, October 23, 1940 at Ogden, January 29,
1941 at Salt Lake City, and on ¥arch 18, 1941 at Salt
Lake City. The reports of the hearings are numbered
12, 25, and 30 in the certificate of the Industrial Comn1ission to this court, and for the purpose of convenience
and to avoid confusi~on we will refer to N'o. 12 as 1 T.,
No. 25 as 2 T., and No. 30 as 3 T., since the pages of
the hearings are eached numbered from 1 on consecutively.

Where the remainder of the record is referred

to, it will be referred to by the letter R.
There is practically no ~dispute in the facts in this
case. Dorothy Marie Hughe-s, a minor, sixteen and a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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half yt~ars old, \Ya~ employed by the plaintiff Royal
Canning Con1pauy at its canning fac.tory in Ogden, Utah,
July 3~ 1940. She worked eig·ht hours on July 3, three
and a half hours on July 4, did not work July 5, eight
hours on July G, ten hours July 7, ten hours July 8,
and three and a half hours July 9. July 3, the date of
her employment, can1e on a
ednesday. Most of the
time she \Yas engaged in sorting cherries. On July 9,
\Yhich \Yas Tuesday, the forewoman put her to work
sorting cherries on the side ~of the belt where there
were proper guards and barricades to protect the workmen from moving machinery. ~fiss Hughes however,
moved to the other side of the belt, which was unguarded. Sometimes the cherries became stuck in the
chute and \Yhen this occurred, the girls had tn loosen
them and were provided with a :stick for the purpose,
which stick was between eighteen and twenty inches
long. On the day in question the cherries became stuck
in the chute and ~fiss Hughes, instead of using the stick,
tried to loosen the cherries with her hand and her dress
got caught in the shaft and in trying to loosen it, both
~of her hands were drawn into the shaft and the injury
in question occurred. ( 1 T. 35-44)

'''T

The only injury with which we are here concerned
is the injury to her right hand. She received injuries
to her left arm, but with those we are not here concerned. As a result of the injury to her right hand,
it was necessary to operate the thumb at the proximal j'oint. This was done by Dr. Dumke of Ogden, Utah
(R. 20). Actually the thumb was not operated exactly
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
at the proximal joint, there being a remnant of proximal
phalanx (R. 26), but for all practical purposes ·we concede the operation of the thun1b at the proximal joint.
The thun1b was pronounced healed and she was released
fro1n the doctor on August 26, 1940 (1 T. 15 and 21).
The applicant, defendant here, testified that at the time
of the first hearing the thumb was better than at the
ti~ne she was released as surgically ~ealed on August
26 (1 T. 15).
The applicant, as heretofore stated, \vas employed
on July 3, 1940 and was allowed to go to w~ork without
the employment certificate provided by Section 14-6-5,
Compiled La,vs ·of Utah, 1933 as amended by Session
Laws of Utah, 1933, page 17. The reasons given from
the evidence for this situati~on are fo·und in the trans-cript of the first hearing, pages 25-29, and show that in
1939 the n·epartment or Division ·of Unemployment of
the Industrial Commission called the Manager of the
Royal Canning Company and requested hi1n to secure
his . employees thr,ough that department. This he did
through the season of 1939 by phonii~g the Department
his needs and the Department would then send him the
girls and women required. 'Vhen the season of 1940
began, the Department again requested that he use its
services in ·securing employees, which he consente'rl to
do. The Department would· comply with his request
and send him sufficient empl,oyees to answer his purposes. This applied equally to minors and aqults. In
.the first part. of July, 1940, he phoned the D·epartment
and requested it to send him some employees to work
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in the eherries and apricots.

None of the nnnor em-

ployees shO\Yed up \Yith the en1ployn1ent et:>rtificates required by la"·· On 8aturday, J nly 6, the girls tried to
get their employment certificates froin the Superintendent of Schools of Ogden as required by the Child \Velfare statute heretofore referred to, Chapter 11, Session
La\Ys of lTtah, 19·33, and \Yere told that they \vould have
to come to the office bet\\-een 8 :00 and 9 :00 as there was
nobod~- there other than at that hour to issue the pernlits; that they \Yould haYe to first secure employn1ent,
then apply to the office for an application for certificate,
take it home, secure the signature of their parents, come
to the plant and secure the approval of the management,
then return to the Superintendent's office and get the
permits.- This situation ''Tith the school office .open only
one hour "\v.ould cause the girls two days loss of time.
The ~lanager of the Royal Canning Co1npany on Monday, July 8, called the office of the Superintendent of
Schools and was told he would not be back until the
afternoon. The Manager called again Tuesday morning
·and the Superintendent \Yas again out. That afternoon
the Superintendent called the Manager, who asked him
why they could not get the permits and he told the
Manager that the person in charge \Yas out of town
but that he \YOuld have someone come to the plant on
,,. . ednesday and issue the applications. A representative
of the Superintendent's office caine to the plant on \"Vednesday, issued the applications, returned on Thursday
noon and wrote the permits. So the Manager had been
trying for a \Yeek to get the office of the Superintendent
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

of Schools to perform its duty under the statute and
had been unable to do so. In the meantime, on Tuesday,
July 9, the applicant was injured and after that Mrs.
Shupe of the Industrial Commission came to Ogden and
told the Superintendent that they must keep their office
open between 9 :00 and 5 :00 as required by law, in .order
that these minors might secure their employment certificates. This also appears in a detailed report to
the Industrial Commission found at R. 1, 2, and 3. It
thus appears that a department of the State through
the Industrial Commission urged the employment of
these minors by the Royal Canning Company and sent
them there without employment certificates and another
division of the State, the Superintendent of Schools, by
failing to perform his duty as required by law, made it
impossible for the minors to secure. their employment
certificates and in· the meantime an accident happened
to Miss Hughes.
As heretofore stated, the applicant's right thumb
was amputated at approximately the proximal joint,
which \vas surgically healed August 26, 19·40. Between
the first and second hearings, on its own motion, the
Industrial Comn1ission held a hearing before a medical
advisory board appointed by it, although there was no
question at the first hearing concerning the exact extent
of the injuries sustained by the applicant. At the
n1edical advisory hearing certain arbitrary conclusions
were arrived at with nothing to support them that the
applicant had suffered a disability of approximately
seventy-five per cent at the wrist (R. 16). As a result
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of these conclusions the second hearing- was held and
medical testin1ony introduced, which shows that the applicant has suffered a norn1al an1putation of the thumb
at app-roximately the proxin1a.l j·oint.
The Commission later held the third hearing and
although the evidence is undisputed that the applicant's weekly \Yage \Yas only $12.90 and that this was
about the average earned by other employees doing
the san1e \York, regardless of their age or experience,
the C-ommission found \Yith no evidence whatever to
support the finding, that because of the applicant's age
and experience she might reas~onably be expected to ea.rn
sufficient to entitle her to compensation at the rate of
$16.00 per week, which would bring her wages some''here in the neighborhood of :$26.00 or ·$27.00 a week,
or more than double what she was actually earning.

.

As a result

~of

these hearings the Commission

awarded the applicant compensation against the Royal
Canning Company under Section 14-..6-27 of .Chapter 11,
Session Laws of Utah, 1933, and a like amount against
the Continental Casualty Company, as the carrier of the
Workmen's Compensation for the Royal Canning Company. The Commission found that her wages at the
tin1e of injury entitled her to compensation at the rate
of $8.31 per week for the period of temporary total
disability ending August 25, 1940, in the sum of $54.61
against each of the plaintiff's (we shall hereafter discuss the matter of wages) and in addition, instead of
awarding her the thirty weeks provided by the statute
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for loss of the thumb at the proximal joint, found that
she had a seventy-five per cent disability at the wrist
and gave her an additional one hundred and twelve and
a half weeks, not at the rate of $8.31 per week, but at
the rate of $16.00 per week, making a total award against
each of the plaintiffs for the additional period of
$1800.00.
#

STATEMENT OF ERRORS.

It is the plaintiffs' contention that there is no justification for the award· of double eompensation; that the
statute provides a fixed and definite sum for the loss
of the thu1nb at the proximal joint and that the Commission was without authority to increase the weekly
period beyond that provided by statute; and that there
is absolutely no evidence to jus'tify the finding that the
applicant after August 25, 1940 would earn sufficient.
money to entitle her to compensation at the rate of
$16.00 per week.
ARGUMENT.

At the

~outset

may we state that we have no quarrel

with the Comnlission 's findings that the applicant, Miss
Hughes, was earning sufficient to entitle her to .compensation at the rate of $8.31 per .week. The testimony
shows, however, that during the six days she worked
she a~tually earned $12.90, which was about the same
average of the other girls who 'vere working with her
in the same kind of work (Defendants' Exhibits 3 and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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4:: R,. 31, ~1~). It is true that the first report of injury
(R. 7) states that she was working seven days a week
at 30 cents per hour, but this report, the testimony
shows, is not true (3 T. 11, 1:2). The testimony ·all
through the east'\ sho\YS that the girls received 30 cents
an hour only "-bile they 'vere "~orking and the time they
"'"orked depended entirely upon the availability of fruit.
\\~ e shall discuss the \Yag-e question, however, In more
detail under subdivision III hereafter.

I.
1\~ e

feel there is absolutely no justification for a
double award in this case .. It is true that the Child
Labor La.,v, Chap. 11, Session Laws of 19:33, subdivision
5, provides that minors under eighteen shall not be
employed \Yithout an employment certificate. The chapter, ho\vever, makes it the duty of the school authorities
t.o issue the certificate. They may refuse to issue the
certificate, but that was not done with any of these
girls. The Industrial Commission is charged with the
duty of enforcing the provisions of the chapter. In
construing the law we must take into consideration all
of its pr.ovisions and· construe them altogether to accomplish the purposes desired. Section 11 provides
that if a certificate of employment is not on file, the
enforcement officers may demand the empl.oyer to secure
the ·certificate within seven days or refuse to employ
the minor. It thus seems apparent that under facts
such as \Ye have here, where the Industrial Commission
itself sends the minors to work without certificates and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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therefore ha·s. ikn9wledge .of the situat~on; that it is the
duty of the Industrial Commission, before any liability
can .attach to the employer, to a:llow him to produce the
certificate upon seven days notice. So far a.s the employer is concerned in this case we have an even more
favorable situation. The Industrial Commission requested the employer to employ the girls to assist in
the unemployment situation in the state. The employer
was engaged in the canning of perishable fruits, which
must be handled in1mediately in order to prevent them
from spoiling. The employer consented to assist the
Industrial Commission in its efforts to relieve unemployment and whenever it desired empl,oyees, it so notified
the Commission and the Commission itself sent the employees to the ·einployment. The Commission knew that
en1ployment certificates were required and that they could
only be secured from the school authorities and yet it
made no effort until after the accident in question to
require the s-chool authorities to perform their duties
in the premises. The failure to have employment certificates on file was not the fault of the employer. It w.as
the fault primarily of the school authorities in failing
t~o perform their duties, and secondarily, of the Industrial
Commission employment department, fi~st in failing to
see that the people it sent to work had -certificates, and
seoondly in not requiring the school authorities to perform their duties. So that if any wrong was committed
by the employer it was entirely induced by the public
authorities with whom the employer was trying to. cooperate.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It must be remembered that this accident did not
happen beeause the nrinor had no employment certificate.
Had she w•orked on the side of the belt where she was
placed and used the stick proYided for her to dislodge
the cherries from the chute, she would not have been
injured. The school authorities did not think ·that the
employment "'"as injurious to the minors because they
issued certificates to the other girls enga.g~ed in the ~same
class of work.
It is established doctrine in this state that the public
authorities cannot induce the· comn1ission of an offense
and· then hold the offender liable. State v. McCornish,
59 Utah 58, 201 P. 637. In this case this court quotes: ·
it is 1nade to appear that the offense
charged """as induced by a. detectiv·e or other person, * . * * hoth the prosecuting officers and
the trial courts should carefully scrutinize the
evidence and should permit no conviction to he
had, or, if had, to stand, in case the off-ense was
induced as aforesaid.-" (Italics added).
,,,,~hen

This is the law generally as is shown in the recent case
of Sanders v. State, (Oklahoma) 113 P. (2d) 198, wherein the court says :
"It has been held that where officers or those
acting under them first suggest the comn1ission
of the criminal act or lu.re the accused into the
commission of such acts, that sound public policy
will not uphold a. conviction.'' (Italics added).
I

'

It is true that these are actual criminal cases, bu't the
Child W-elfare statute under consideration here is :also
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a penal statute and the employer has been subjected to
a penalty thereunder by the Industrial Commission. He
has been subjected to a penalty for no fault of his own
and for doing a thing he was induced to do by officers
of the state and because other officers of the state failed
and neglected to perform their duties under ·the law.
V\Te did everything that we eould to cooperate with
the public authorities to relieve unemployment and
everything that we could to secure the employment certificates and it \Vas through no fault of ours that the
per1nits were not secured and it was through no fault
of ours that the girl was injured. It seems highly
unjust and inequitable that we should he penalized when
we have done no actual wrong. There is no question
involved here of employing girls who had been refused
employment certificates. Had the school authorities been
on the .job,. this girl would have had her certificate, the
same as the rest of them got theirs. ·So that the purposes of the act were not frustrated by anything that
we did and this court could very well say, under Section
11, that under the circumstances it was the duty of the
Industrial Comn1ission, after it had sent the girls to
work, to give us seven days within which to secure their
·certificates.
Evert should this court hold that we are liable f~or
the penalties pres.cribed by Section 27 ·of the chapter,
there is nothing in the record to justify any award
against the Royal Canning Company other than the
period of temporary total disability, which expired AuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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gust 25, 1940, plus 30 additi~onal \Yeeks at $8.31 per week
for the loss of the thumb at the proximal joint.
\\""" e earnestly insist, ho""eYer, that under the facts
in this ease the penalty ag·aiust us is unauthorized and
unjust and as to the Royal Canning Co1npany the award
~hould be annulled; that the statute is penal and the
eonunission of any offense, if any vvas eomnri tted, was
induced by public officials, and that we were lured into
it by their conduct.

II.
~-\.s

heretofore sho\Yn, the claimant suffered the loss
of the right thumb at approximately the proximal joint.
Our statute, Secti~on 42-1-62, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, as amended by Chapter 41, pages 80 and 81, Session La 'Ys of Utah, 1937, provides : ''For loss of * * *
one thm11b at the proximal joint, 30 weeks.'' There are
nurnerous other specific provisions and at the end of
the section appears the follo-vving:
"For anY other disfio·urement or the loss of
bodily function not otherruise provided for herein~ such period of compensati~on as the commission shall deem equitable and in proportion to
compensation in other cases, not e~~ceeding two
hundred weeks." (Italics added).
~

0

Another specific provision of the chapter is that for the
loss of one hand the payments shall be 150 weeks. In
spite of the fact that this claimant has not lost her
hand and has all of the digits of the right hand with
the exception of the right thumb, the ·comn1ission proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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'ceeded upon· the theory that she had. lost. seventy-fiv~
per <·ent of the use of the hand.
The statute ·is <·lear and explicit that for the loss
of. the thu1nb at the proximal joint the additional compensation shall be 30 "reeks and it is only for any l~oss
or disfigurement not otherwise provided for that additional compensati,on may be awarded. In other words,
where there is a specific and definite loss, the Legislature
has arbitrarily fixed the amount of compensation and
it is beyond the power of the Commission to change it.
If this vvere not true, then n1edical experts upon whom the
Commission might call would fix the amount of com-·
pensation by their opinions and the definite legislative
enactment would be overthrown· by the medical experts,
vvhose judgrnent would be substituted for that of the
.Legislature. The probable reason the Legislature fixed
these definite amounts for specific losses was to take
them out of this realm of speculation so that the amounts
of compensation would be certain and sure. All the
courts hold that compensation statutes are not designed
to grant exact compensation for inju~ies, but to make
it certain and sure that an injured employee will receive a definite and precise amount. If the Industrial
Commission for the loss of a thumb may conclude that
there has been a loss of seventy-five per cent of the use
of the hand at the wrist, it might also ·conclude that if
the thumb \vas ;oil the left hand, there had been no loss of
the ·use of the hand and ther~fore refuse to award any
co.mpensati·on, or determine that there was only fiv~ per
cent loss ~ind make its award on that basis. ·Assume for
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·pli.rpose~

·of illustration that one in the legal profession

lost his thun1b on the left hand.
mission mig-ht

,~ery

The Industrial C·om-

\Yell assume that he had suffered

little or no loss and 1nedica.l experts might so testify,
but that

"~ould

'
not depriYe hin1, if he was a.n employee

of someone, of a definite amount prescribed by the
Legislature for the loss of his thumb. A pianist might
lose his little finger at the proximal joint and nearly
every d~octor would testify that he thereby had lost the
complete use of his hand and upon such testimony, if
the Industrial Commission is right in this ease, it ,could
a\Yard him 150 weeks ·instead of 9 weeks as provided
b}T the statute.- Of course, the loss of the thumb tremendously impairs the use of the hand, bu~ it is not
the l·os-s of the hand and there is no los.s of the hand
~n this case, although the Commission has based its
award upon that basis. Sex or vocation are not the
determining factors in the question of use. Because
thi.s applicant is a girl and can't peel potatoes or sew
is not the determining fact~or in fixing her compensation.
Dr. Dumke is the man who performed the operation. He did not testify. But at R. 20 is found his
report to the Industrial Commission, in which he states:
"She has an amputation .of her right thumb at the proximal j~oint. She·uses her hand well, but her entire thumb
is gone, giving her the usual disability which you have
with the loss of the entire thumb.'' .Thus the doctor
·who performed the amputation is on record to the effect
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that the claimant has only the usual loss that comes
with the l·oss of a thumb.
At the first hearing Dr. Dumke's assistant, Dr. J. L.
Price, testified that Dr: Dumke's report was correct
(1 T. 19) and that there were no cords broken above
where the .scar extends ( 1 T. 20). He also testified
that applicant's Exhibit B (R. 14), which is another
report by Dr. Dumke, was also correct (1 T. 20) and in
that report Dr. Dumke says that the result of the amputation is good. The applicant herself testified at the
time of the hearing the thumb was in better condition
than when she was discharged on August 26 (1 T. 15).
Dr. Price further testified that the loss of the thumb
would not impair the arm aside from discomfort (1 T.
21) : He was personally familiar with the . applicant
from the time of the injury all through her period of
convalescence. We thus have the testimony of these
two doctors, who personally attended the case, that we
have here simply the usual ease of the amputation of
the thumb.
Next comes the Commission 'On its own motion and
has the applicant appear before its own medical advisory
board in Salt Lake City (R. 16). The medical advisory
hoard, without stating any reasons therefor, conclude
that her disability is approximately seventy-five per
cent at the wrist. It gave absolutely no reason for this
·conclusion, and neither this court nor anyone else can
deternlin~ why they made such an estimate-a clear
case of substituting their judgment for that of the Legislature. The medical advisory board did say, ho,vever,
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that she
all thtt

\Ya~

able to clench the fist and extend and abduet

fiugPr~ "~it hin

n·ormal range.

The only reason

they gaYe for their conclusion of seYenty-five per cent
i~

that she is right-handed and has lost the use of the
right thumb. This bald conclusion of the ·medical advisory board was unsatisfactory to the plain tiffs here
and the Oommission again on its own motion held a
second hearing at Salt Lake City, Utah. This, in spite
of the fact that both sides rested at the first hearing
and neither side asked for a. rehearing or a reopening
of the ~ase. Both sides were represented by counsetl
at the first hearing and both sides int:voduced all the
eYidence that they desired. Notwithstanding this, the
Co1nmission on its ·own motion conducted a second hearing at Salt Lake City, Utah, a.t which time nobody but
doctors testified. The Commission called two of the doctors who acted on its medical advis,ory board, D~. Hicken
and Dr. Capener. Dr. Hicken again stated that his
opinion "\vas that the applicant had lost seventy-five
per cent-of the use of _the hand at the wrist, but when
asked to give his reasons he had none, other than that
the. thumb ''Tas the most valuable one of the digits. He
said ( 2 T. 4) : ''The applicant has free use· of the second,
third and fourth digits and grasps things well. There is
apparently no change of thermal sensation or signs of
atrophy of these muscles.'' He te-stified that the p-roximal joint is not gone and the metacarpal bone is still
there. He testified that if she had lost the metacarpal
bone completely, she would be worse off than she is
now. (2 T. 7).
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The statute for the lo.ss of the thumb and the rnetacarpal bone only al~ows 60 weeks, Session Laws of Utah,
1937, page 80, and yet the Industrial Commission here
h~s

awarded her 112lj2 weeks when she is better off than

if she had lost the metcarpal bone eompletely. This
clearly indicates the vice of permitting the Industrial
Commission to do what it has done in this ease. If it can
do so, then there is no way by which employers or
insurance carriers can fix their rates and as a result not
only they, but their employees as well, suffer from
such uncertainties. We think this is one of. the reasons
that the Legislature intended to and did remove these
specific injuries from the realm of speculation.

Dr. Hicken did testify that she had some scar tissue
which interfered with the function of the wrist, but only
because. she has no phalange-s on the thumb

t~o

get Ia

g,ood grasp· of the hand. That is true in any amputation
of the thumb, so that there is nothing more unusual in
this case than there is in any amputation of the thumb.
Dr. Capener testified substantially the same as Dr.
Hicken. He, however, said that he based his estimate of '
seventy-five per cent on the fact that she had scar tissue
which might at s~ome future time be injured by some
slight accident. He said (2 T. 15) that his answer was
based on this scar tissue being present and because of
what might happen in the future, but not for anything
that had now occurred. His opinion is pure speculation
and conjecture and such opinion, this court has reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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peatedly held,
dence.

n~ \Ye

shall hereafter :show, 1s not evi-

Dr. James P. Kerby, an expert in X-ray, also te.stified at the second hearing. He testified that he had
not only exa1nined the ap plicant but had a picture of her
right hand and that the right hand and the 'vrist region
were normal with the exception that the thumb had been
amputated at approximately the p·roximal joint. He
stated that she had not sustained as complete a loss
as she ".,.ould have done had she lost the thumb completely at the proximal joint. He further testified that
the thumb presented the usual appearance when there is
a good surgical amputation and that there was no injury
to the metacarpal bone (2 T. 11). His report was
received in evidence as Defendants' Exhibit 2 (R. 26)
and shows· that there is normaJl appearance .of the lower
half of the radius and ulna and of the carpal and metac.arpal bones, and no bony pathology.
1

...._>\.lso testifying at the second hearing was Dr.
}Iartin ·c. Lindem, 'vho had ·examined the applicant and
her X-rays. He als-o testified that the metacarpal bone
is intact and that the muscle attachments to it are .all
intact and that her injury is well healed; that she has
only the usual situation in an amputation of the thumb
at the proximal joint; that she has normal movement of
the hand (2 T. 16, 17). The Commissioner condu0ting
the hearing insisted on the doctor giving his· opinion as
t.o· the question of percentage ·of los.s as ·compared to a
normal hand. The doctor did not care· to answer the
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qnPstion and clearly indicated that it is impossible to
HllH\\'t~r su<·h a question, stating that that depends on
what she does-would be ~one hundred per cent loss to
sOUl<l people auc.l no loss to others. When pressed, however, by the Uo1nmissioner, for an answer, the doctor
aHs\\·ered:
~'I ,,·ould ha Ye to put an arbitrary estirnation
on that and I don't think it can be compensated
but I would say between 50){ and 100%.

COl\1. JUGLER:

50)/o actual

loss·~

A. I think it should be put do\\'n at about
and that V\rould be arbitrary.
i\1R. J():\'"ES: That would he true in every
case?
A. I should put that arbitrary esti1nate and
call it 50;;. . "
50}~,

This clearly indicates that any estima~te made by
the doctors is purely arbitrary and guesswork and it is
for that very reason that the Legislature provided a
specific amount. The testimony shows \vi~thout dispute
that all the applicant has is the usual loss of a thumb
at the proxin1al joint. Of course, it ,,~ould be very
difficult to co1npensate her at all for this loss but the
,,~isdo1n of the statute is not for our discu,ssion but is
solely within the discretion of the Legislature. The
only tin1e the Industrial Commission can grant additional compensation is for disfigurement and losses not
otherwise provided for. But in this case \:ve have a loss
that is specifically provided for. The cases are uniform
in holding that where there is provision for a specific
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los~

the Gonunission has no po,ver or jurisdiction to
grant any eo1npen~ation other than that specifically
provided for.
In Spring Canyon ()oal Co. v. Industrial Co'ln.missian. 57 Utah 208, 193 P. S~l, th~ e1nployee l:ost the use
of his leg, "·hich "-:as specifically provided for in the
statute. This case \Yas decided before the 1919 amendment, but the principle involYed there is the same as is
involved here. This court said, referring to loss of members where there is a fixed and definite amount, at page
:212 of the lT tah R.eports :
'' .J._\s to these amounts the commission has no
discretion; "\Yhen the loss of the member is ascertained the law specifically determines the coinpensation. ''
·
And further ·on, on page 213, this -court states :

'' \V. e .are constrained to hold that the Ianguage last quoted is mandatory in hoth form
and substance, that it definitely fixes the conlpensation to be paid for the loss of specific members of the body, and that the compensation thus
fL~ed is exclusive of any other compensation for
dis.ability arising solely fron1 the loss of the particular member in question.''
In the case of North Beck Mining Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 58 Utah 486, 200 P. 111, \vhere the employee
lost m~ore than one finger, this court clearly shows that
it is only when there is a loss of more than one finger
that the decreased usability of the hand is a fair 1nethod
of compensation. The court pointed out that it is ·a
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matter of common knowledge that if only one finger is
lost, the adjoining fingers begin to function for the missing rnember and soon acquire the power to a gre.at extent
of taking place of the lost finger, but if more than one
finger is lost this situation is not true.
The Commission in arriving at its conclusions here
apparently considered the vocational aspects of the case.
This the Commission may not do, as this court has held
in Broderick v. Industrial Commission, 63 Utah 210,
224 P. 87 6. In that case, page 217 of the Utah Reports,
the court also said :
''Then again, in the event that the en1ployee has
.suffered a specific injury, he is entitled to a
specific amount fixed by ·statute for such injury,
and this is so a~lthough he suffered no diminution
of l·oss of wages or earnings.''
In that case the court referred to the Spring Canyon
Case, supra; pointed out that' in that case the statute
made a specific allowance for a specific injury, and that
the C.ommis-sion can not add ·anything to the amount fixed
by statute.
In Aetna Lif'e Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, 6.4 Utah 230, 228 P. 1081, the court said at page
236 of the Utah Reports:
''the injury resulted in the loss of a member of
the body, the .compensation n1ust be fixed in accordance with the schedule, which provides a
specific compensation for the loss of ·a particular
member ·of the body. That is, if, 'as in this case,
the injury re-sults in 'the loss of one leg at or so
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near the hip joint as to preelude the use· of: an
artificial limb,' the payment of the week~y amount
must continue for 180 weeks, and no more.''
It is true that the court in that case did say that if other
injuries oc.curred in addition to the specific one, the Com~
mission might haYe s~ome dis-cretion. But this court
continued: .
'" \\nen the loss of the leg occurs, or the loss of
function is eomplete, he would then receive the
amount fixed by the statute for the loss of the
leg."
J:n that case the court pointed out, as we have above,
that if the Commission -can increase the statutory compensation, 'it can likewise ·decrease it and. thus deprive
an injured employee of what is legally due him.

The

court -on page 241 again approved the Spring Canyon
Case, supr.a.
That the disfigurement caused here by the amputa~
tion is not con1p·ensable other than for the loss of the·
thumb would appear from the case of Denv,er & R. G. w~
R. Co. v. l'Ypdustrial Commission, 73 Utah 86, 272 P. 239,
wherein this court at page 91 of the Utah Reports says:
"The term 'other disfigurement' appearing in
the statute does not seem to have any practical
significance. There is unquestionably a disfigurement when the hand is entirely lost and when
the Legislature allowed, for such injury, compensation for 150 weeks it must· be assumed that it
to.ok into consideration disfigur~ment as-· well as
loss of function.''
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Again in the V~tkelich v.lndustrial Commission case,
62 Utah 486, 220 P. 1073, this eourt at page 490 of the
lJ t nh Reports said:

''By providing a different basis of

compen~

·Sa tion f~or

particularly described injuries, those
injuries are to be excluded from general pro vi-.
sions 'Nhich Vlould .otherwise include them.''

While it is true that this court has held that it is
not necessary for the Commission to make findings, in
the case of American Smelt. & Ref. Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 79 Utah 302, 10 P. (2d) 918, at pages 306-7
of the Utah Reports it held that when the Commission
does make findings, this court can test the sufficiency of
the findings and that they must be based upon competent
evidence: There is no competent evidence in this record
that the applicant sustained anything more than the
usual loss of the thumb. As we have pointed out, an
examination of Dr. Capener 's evidence' shows that his
conclusion is based up,on a possibility of what might
happen in the future and Dr. Hicken's testimony is a
rnere guess or conjecture.
In a very recent case, Pennock v. Newhouse Realty
Co., 97 Utah 408, 93 P. (2d) 482, this court pointed out
the vice of such evidence, and rules out the medical
testimony on the ground that it was purely speculative.
The question is not what might happen, but the situation as it actuaHy exists. The court says at page 415
of the Utah Reports :
"To state what generally happens in such cases
leaves it entirely to the speculation of the jury
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as to \Yht.~ther or not it is happening· to thP plniutiff. ~'
The eYidenre here clearly sho"·s that the pl~intiff has a
g·ood reeoYery, an excellent surg-ical anrputation, the
pictures sho"~ a normal hand and \Yrist except for the
loss of the thumb. In eYery an1putation there would
be scar tissue and to speculate that at s.ome future
time the scar tissue might become involved is entirely
beyond the province of the Industrial Commission. The
testimony of Dr ..Lindem clearly illustrates the vice of
permitting speculation in a case such as this. When
compelled to testify, he said. his evidence was purely
arbitrary and clearly indicated that he did not think it
\\-as a matter of his opinion.
The courts in other states are 1n accord with the
rule for which we are contending to the effect that
where there is a specific schedule, no additional payment
may· be exacted. The Supreme Court of Minnesota in
the. case of Sheldon v·. Gopher Granite Co., 219 N. W.
867, says at page 868 :
1

•' The statute takes no .account of the fact that
certain of the fingers on. the hand are of more
use or service than others, or that the thumb is,
perhaps, more indispensable than any .other finger.''
and continuing:
''The instant case is f.or the loss of a n1ernber or
part of a member specifically compensated. By
44 relator is likewise excluded, for his loss is
enun1erated in the preceding subdivision 6 (c).''
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'rhe Pennsylvania Supreme Court 1n the case of
Lentee v. Lucci, 119 Atl. 132, says:
''In other words, this legislative mandate fixed
the amount to be paid in such cases, without considering, but including, all incapacity to labor
that may be connected therewith, whether such
incapacity he t otal, partial, or no incapacity at
all.''
1

And further :
"The compensation mentioned ·is restricted by
precise language, regardless of the fact that a
permanent injury might otherwise aff·ect capacity
to work. The standard thus fixed is in the nature
of -compensation for the damage resulting from
the loss of the members there named, without
regard t o personal capacity to labor, or loss of
earning power.''
1

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court continues:
''But, in these case~s, where it is claimed that
some other part of the body is affected, it must
definitely and positively appear that it is so
affected as a. direct result of the permanent injury; the casual connection must be con1plete,
~and, further, the disability must be separate and
distinqt from that which normally follows an
injury under paragraph (c), and must endure
beyond the time therein 1nentioned. There must
be a destruction, derangement, or deficiency in
the organs of the other parts of the body. · It
does not include pain, annoyance, inconveniences,
disability to work, or anything that rrtay come
wnder the ter1n 'all disability,' or normally resulting .from the permanent injury." (Italics added).
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The court again says :
argn1nen t is based on a \vrongtheory-that ineapaeity, and not injury, controls
this section.''
~ '..._\.ppellan t 's

The Supreme C.ourt of Ohio in the case of State v.
Tndustrial Corn1nissi.on, 183 N. E. 871, says:
'·For loss of member the a \Yard has no relation to the · in1pair1nent of his earning· capacity
during- the continuance thereof,' but, on the con.trary, is arbitrarily fixed by the statute.''
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bowlin, 3 P. (2d) 663, says:
'''\. .here the statute fixes the number of weeks
that the payment for various specific injuries
shall continue, it is, of course, error to award
compensation for a longer time.''
The Supreme Court of Colorado in Colorado Fuel
& Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 Pae. 955, announces the same rule, as does also the Supreme Court
of Arizona in the case of Ujevich v. Inspiration Cons.
Copper Co., 25 P. (2d) 273, wherein the court say•s:
''The Legislature selected certain kinds of injuries or losses that empl oyees suffer and fixed
a definite sum or a rule for ascertaining that sum
and said, in effect, such sun1 together \vith the
temporary total disability compensation shall be
in full satisfaction of the employee's loss. It
provided con1pensation for such loss whether any
pern1anent disability to earn wages follovved or
not. It assumed that every loss enumerated
1
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:, ·r.'
·;

would ··cause some per1nanent loss of earning
. powe:r, and arbitrarily fixed the compensation
theref or. :n

.1 ,-•.• ,
1
·: ·

1

' •

~\·

f

It would appear, therefore, under the facts in this
~~&.~.~' ,that the ~Legislature, having fixed an additional
thirty weeks for the loss of a thunlb at the proximal
joirit, has precluded the Cq1nmission from awarding any
further ·compensation for such loss. The evidence fails
t1o sustain the Con1mission in its award of seventy-five
per c.ent of. the. lo.ss of the hand .at the wrist, since it
conclnsively appears that all there is here is the usual
~.mputation of the thumb.
1

•

''

l

III.
Our statute, Section 42-1-71, Revised Statutes of
U tab, 1933, provides :
"If it is established that the injured employee was of such age and experience -vvhen
injured that under natural conditions his wages
would be expected to increase, that. fact n1ay be
c.onsidered in arriving· at his average \veekly
·wage.''
Because of this section the Commission held the
thi~d hearing and awarded the applicant compensation
aft'er August 25, ~940, at the rate of. $16.00 a week.
L

.,

.

· . , In our opinion it is somewhat fruitless to discuss
this .pha.se of the ease. because there is no semblance
of evidence tu support this phase of the a ward. The
evidence sho\\~s without conflict that the applicant and
those engaged in ·similar occupations, regardless of age
i
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or experience, earned approximately the same wages
as the ap·plica.nt did at the tin1e of injury (Defendant's
Exhibits 3 and 4: R. 31, 32). The record shows without
conflict that the applicant was being paid the maximum
"'"ages fior the \York in which she was engaged (3 T. 9
and 10); that 1940 was a good year and it would be pure
speculation as to· whether she would earn more or less
in other years ( 3 T. 15, 16, 20, 21, 22).

Tlie evidence;

further shows without conflict that age and experien-ce
are not

con~rolling

capacity.

factors in this industry in ·earning

The law is well settled that the increase in

wages contemplated is the increase in the occupation
pursued at the time of injury.

It seems somewhat un-

necessary to discuss this phase of the case, but inasmuch
as the I~dustrial Commission went out· of its way. to
a'vard this applicant far more than she was entitled to,
such discussion becomes necessary.
There is not a word of evidence in the record that
she would ever have earned or ever be able to earn
sufficient to entitle her to compensation at the rate of
$16.00 p·er week. As we have hereto:flore stated, compensation at that rate ~ould be based upon wages earned
by her of $26.00 or $27.09 per week. The evidence shows
that the applicant is under-nourished, has had an· operation for the removal .of gall stones, and that since her
injury has had her gall bladder and tonsils removed,
and that she is in very poor .physical condition, no:ne of·
which had reference to the accident (3 T. 23 and R.· 11).
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The Commission found that her actual wages entitled her to compensation at the rate of $8.31 p·er week.
With this finding we have ll'O quarrel, although it is
somewhat higher than. the statute provides. As heretofore stated, the first report of injury that she was
working seven days per week at thirty cents an hour
is not true (3 T. 12). The girls only worked when there
was fruit for them to work on and they were 1only paid
the actual time that they worked, and the evidence shows
without dispute that none of them earned as high as
$21.00 per week and could not have done so in the year
in which they were employed, which year was a good
year (3 T. 21, 22).
A statute similar to ours has seldom been construed,
but the courts that have construed it hold that any
increase in wages is to be considered only in the occupation in which the employee was engaged and is not to
be based upon the probable wage, but actually what was
earned in the industry at the time the e1np loyee reached
majority. ,JVes~ern Pac. R. Co., v. lndu,strial Accident
Cornmission, ('Cal.) 181 P. 787. And ·in the Massachusetts case of In re Gagnon, 117 N. E. 321, the court said:
1

''The s-cheme of the act is that the employer
shall be insured against the losses fr,om personal
injury to employees arising out of and in the
course ·of their employment. The cost of such
insurance can be determined so long as the basis
on which compensation is t~o he reckoned is 'vages
paid by the e1nployer. It can readily be determined so long as the standard fixed by the definition of average weekly wages in part 5, S-ec. 2,
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above quoted, is .follo\vetl But it would ~be a
1natter of utter uneerta.inty if the compensation
to be paid should depend, not upon wages paid,
but upon \Yages \Yhich the Industrial Accident
Board after an injury may find upon independent
eYidence, perhaps not readily open to the employer during the period of empl1oyment, that the
injured employee might have earned in some
other employment or field of activity.
" ~ \\""" ag·es' as used in the statute must be
taken to refer to the only wages referred to any\Y here in the act (with the exception noted),
namely, the 'vages earned in the particular employment out of which the injury arose.''
The finding of the Industrial Commission that the
applicant would have earned sufficient money to entitle
her to compensation at the rate of $16.00 per week is
based upon mere surmise and conjecture. This court
has repeatedly held that such a finding can not be
sustained. Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Com·
mission of Utah, 75 Utah 220, 284 P. 313, wherein the
court says: ''An award cannot rest upon mere conjecture or possibility." See also Aetna Life Insurance Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 64 Utah 415, 231 P. 442, where
the same rule is announced in the following language
on page 420 of the Utah Reports:
''A finding of a material fact cannot sustain
an award, unless the finding is supported by
substantial evidence.''
We respectfully submit that there is not a word of
evidence in this record to show t'ha t this applicant would
e:ver have . earned 1one cent more than she was earning
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at the time of the injury. There is not a word of evidence to support the Commission's finding that she
would ever earn sufficient money to entitle her to. compensation at· the rate of $16.00 per week. _ In fact, her
physical condition, which has no ref.erence whatever to
the accident, would indicate that she would not be in a
position to work at all in the o-ccupation that she was
pursuing at the time of the injury.
We, therefore, respe·ctfully submit that any one of
the three propositions w-e have advanced is sufficient_ to
annul the award of the Industrial Commission. - The
insurance carrier has no objection whatever to paying
compensation for temporary total disability at the rate
of $8.31 per week to August 25, 1940, and .an additi~onal
·30 weeks thereafter, together with proper medical costs,
but beyond this plaintiffs earnestly insist they have no
legal liability. It is true that the applicant has sustained a serious injury; but the Legislature has seen
fit to provide definite schedules for the compensation
for such an injury. The insurance rates have been
based upon such legislative enactment and if the Industrial Cioiilll]ission is permitted to disregard the legislative mandate, then all employees an~ employers will
suffer by the uncertainty thus created. It is, therefore,
respectfully submitted that the award of the Industrial
Commission should be annulled.
SHIRLEY

P.

JONES,

.Attorney for Plaintiffs.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

